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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
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TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON PROCEDURES FOR CLOSING THE VOTKINSK PORTAL MONITORING FACILITY AND POINTS OF ENTRY; ABSENCE OF ITEMS OF INSPECTION (IOI) AT HILL AFB; AND QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. SITE DIAGRAMS, JULY 21, 2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶11. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-010.

SUMMARY

¶12. (S) A bilateral Working Group Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on July 21, 2008, between the delegations of the Russian Federation and the United States, to discuss the closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility and Points of Entry (POE) with the expectation that the START Treaty will expire in 2009; issues related to the absence of items of inspection (IOI) during a Data Update Inspection conducted at Hill AFB on March 7, 2008; and Russian questions concerning U.S. site diagrams.

¶13. (S) The Russian Delegation recommended that work begin on generating various lists of items and equipment as well as JCIC documents that would be used to determine the disposition and the timetable for removal of those items and equipment from the Portal Monitoring Facility at Votkinsk. The U.S. Delegation expressed the view that it envisioned a similar approach, on both Votkinsk and Points of Entry closure, to that presented by the Russian Delegation.

¶14. (S) The Russian Delegation also expressed its concerns with the information provided to the Russian inspection team which conducted a recent Data Update inspection at the Hill AFB ICBM Repair Facility. Specifically, that Russian inspectors were not told the location of an MM III Training Model of Missile (TMOM) that was absent from the facility at the time of the inspection or the time that the TMOM would

return to the facility which, in their view, was required by the Treaty. Drawing upon the Treaty text, the U.S. Delegation explained that there was no Treaty requirement to inform inspectors of the location of this piece of support equipment since that requirement was applicable only at bomber bases. Further, that since this TMOM was not in transit and was not located on a road between non-contiguous areas of the facility, there was no Treaty requirement to notify inspectors of the arrival time at the inspection site.

¶15. (S) The Russian Delegation expressed concerns regarding the lack of a prompt U.S. response to inspection team documented discrepancies on a number of U.S. site diagrams. In particular, they cited problems with the Oasis and Hill AFB site diagrams which did not have structures large enough to contain items of inspection (IOI) or road exits annotated on them. The U.S. Delegation stated that these structures did not need to be placed on the site diagram as only those structures being used for, or are intended to be used for, IOI are required to be placed on the diagram as stated in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The U.S. Delegation agreed to review other site diagram discrepancies and make any needed corrections.

CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS ON
THE CLOSURE OF VOTKINSK

¶16. (S) Ryzhkov began the meeting by explaining that the Russian Federation felt obligated to raise the issue of closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility due to its experience with the cessation of portal monitoring activities in Magna, Utah once the INF inspection regime came to a close. He noted that a lot of work needed to be done on the tasks related to the similar closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility. Since the JCIC met only twice a year, a lot of the work needed to be accomplished during the intersessional periods. He also noted the role that the JCIC played in facilitating inspection procedures which would also include the closure of Votkinsk.

WE NEED LISTS AND
TIMELINES AND JCIC DOCUMENTS

¶17. (S) Ryzhkov explained that it was the Russian view that various JCIC documents would need to be agreed to so that the competent authorities could be identified and the respective responsibilities and obligations of both Parties could be spelled out. Further, such documents would allow both Parties to fully assess the workload, as well as the timelines for meeting those obligations. He noted that a list of all items that would be removed from the Russian Federation, to include preliminary dates for their removal, would be needed so that the means of transportation as well as the schedule could be determined. He also noted that separate lists for those items which would be given to other organizations within the Russian Federation, as well as items that might be sold to other organizations would need to be produced. A final list would include those items which would be disposed of within the Russian Federation, with particular interest being paid to any environmental or safety-related concerns with such items. He noted that this was done when Magna closed and Russian monitors did have some problems with disposing of certain items due to environmental concerns. Ryzhkov recognized that the form of any JCIC documents would be based upon the opinion of each Party's legal experts, but the options to consider could be an agreement, a joint statement, or a coordinated statement. He noted that the Russian Delegation's view was that the appropriate form would be a JCIC Joint Statement so that all of the obligations of the Parties related to the closure of Votkinsk would be included. He closed by stating that the Parties could have differing views, but these views could move closer together if work were done during the intersessional period through diplomatic channels so that, perhaps, a formal document could

be considered during the next session of the JCIC.

¶8. (S) Couch stated that the U.S. view on how to tackle this issue, and the issue of closing START POEs for that matter, was similar to that of the Russian Federation and asked that the Russian Delegation provide its recommendations in writing on how to accomplish the closure of Votkinsk. Ryzhkov noted that he had intentionally not raised the issue of POEs as it was a multilateral issue. Also, that the closure of POEs would be less complicated and inspectors could simply remove stored equipment during the last inspection. He also agreed to provide a paper outlining Russian recommendations.

SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
MISSING FROM HILL AFB

¶9. (S) Ryzhkov prefaced the discussion on inspection issues by stating that it was traditional for the JCIC to deal with operational or inspection issues and that the next two issues concerning events at Hill AFB and questions on U.S. site diagrams fell into that category. He emphasized that they were working issues and not matters of principle. Referring to the inspection report from the Data Update Inspection conducted by the Russian Federation on March 5-6, 2008 at the Hill AFB ICBM Repair Facility, Ryzhkov explained that the Russian Federation had concerns regarding the information that was conveyed to Russian inspectors by U.S. escorts during the pre-inspection briefing (Reftel). Specifically, the inspection team was not told the location of one of the five MM III TMOMs declared for the facility, but which was absent from the facility. The inspection team was also not told the time of return of this TMOM to the facility as required by paragraphs 8(d) and (e) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.

THE ANSWER IS IN THE TREATY

¶10. (S) Couch noted that the U.S. in-country escort informed the Russian inspection team leader of the type, variant, and reason for the absence of the MM III TMOM which was specified for the inspection site, but was absent when the inspection team arrived at the Hill AFB Repair Facility for ICBMs, in accordance with paragraph 8(d), Section VII of the Inspection Protocol. Further, there was no prohibition against this piece of support equipment being absent from the inspection site and no requirement to return it to the inspection site during the inspection. Smith asked whether the Russian concern was that the information about the absence of this piece of support equipment was not briefed at the pre-inspection briefing or that it was not briefed at all. Ryzhkov responded that this was one concern, but also that the location of the TMOM was not briefed as required by paragraph 8(d) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, nor was the time briefed that the TMOM would return to the site as required by paragraph 8(e). Smith turned the Russia Delegation's attention to the text of the Treaty. He explained that there was no requirement to notify the inspection team of the location of the TMOM since that requirement in paragraph 8(d) was applicable only to heavy bomber bases. Additionally, there was no requirement to notify the inspection team of when the TMOM would return to the inspection site, since the TMOM was not in transit nor was it located on a road between areas of the site but, rather, was at a location performing specific functions and was not returning to the inspection site. In this case, paragraph 8(e) did not apply and U.S. escorts were somewhat confused and quite surprised when the Russian team leader cited this reference in the inspection report. Some what flustered, Ryzhkov noted that it appeared that both Parties understood each other's concerns.

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING;
U.S. SITE DIAGRAMS

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that this issue was not substantive, but was a practical matter concerning U.S. site diagram accuracy. He noted a couple of positive examples where each Party had promptly responded to expressed concerns and site diagrams had been updated. He also pointed out several instances, including the diagrams of Oasis and Hill AFB, where Russian inspectors documented their observations in the official inspection reports over and over again but those concerns had been ignored for many years. These observations included the lack of structures and road exits depicted on the site diagrams. Couch stated that Russian views on certain U.S. site diagrams were well-known but, in the case of the ICBM Repair Facility at Hill AFB, the Russian inspection team leader was informed that the structures listed in the inspection report which were not annotated on the site diagram were not intended to be used for IOI or Support Equipment as specified by paragraph 9(b)(iii) of Annex J to the MOU and, as such, did not need to be placed on the site diagram. He emphasized that Russian inspectors were granted access to all structures at the facility large enough to contain IOI and that the diagram for Hill AFB fully complied with all Treaty requirements. He closed by stating that the United States always took note of Russian concerns regarding U.S. site diagrams and updated its diagrams as appropriate.

¶12. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian language Ad-Referendum text of the S-Series Joint Statement on the site diagram for Drovyanaya, dated July 18, 2008.

¶13. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Couch
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj. Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
LTC Oppenheim
Mr. Smith
Mr. Tessier
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Kashirin
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Semenov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Shevchenko
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)

¶14. (U) Taylor sends.

TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text